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Two JUDGES: DIFFERING VALUES
AND VISIONS

"ADR" TECHNIQUES IN THE
REFORMATION MODEL OF CIVIL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Judge Robert M. Parker*
Leslie J. Hagin **
HIS article advocates a break from the past in terms of how civil
dispute resolution is conducted in this country - specifically, in the
federal district courts. We posit a new model that is public, taxpayersupported, and inclusive of an array of litigation tracks producing speedy,
affordable, fair and reliable decisions. The decisions rendered pursuant to
these tracks carry presumptions of finality. The cumbersome and expensive,
traditional jury trial is provided for some cases as an initial court-tracking
matter, and it is ensured also for those litigants who can overcome the presumption of finality accorded the results of non-traditional track proceedings. Litigants whose cases have initially been placed in non-traditional
tracks may demonstrate to the court, essentially through a cost/benefit-fairness analysis, the need to expend additional litigant and judicial resources on
their cases. These litigants might show the court that there exists a strong
likelihood that a traditional jury trial would produce a substantially different
result from that already obtained through a non-traditional litigation track,
or that a traditional jury trial is necessary to satisfy another important public
interest that would otherwise go unfulfilled. Essentially, we take methods of
dispute resolution traditionally considered "alternative," expand them, and
move them to the front line in the battle against litigation cost, delay, and
the unfair denial of access to the courts. Under our proposed model, the
traditionally "alternative" forms of civil dispute resolution assume the role
Ed. Note: With the authors' concurrence, SMU LAW REVIEW invited a response to this article, which is published in this issue. See G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Reformation Modelfor FederalDistrict Courts, 46 SMU L.
REV. 1935 (1993).
* Chief United States District Court Judge, Eastern District of Texas; Chair, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, United States Judicial Conference. J.D.
1964, University of Texas School of Law; B.B.A. 1961, University of Texas.
** Law Clerk to Judge Robert M. Parker. J.D. 1991, University of Texas School of Law;
B.A. 1988, Austin College.
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of the institutionally routine, and the traditionally routine form of civil dispute resolution ascends to its appropriate place as the institutionally
exceptional.
Our article proceeds as follows. Section I speaks of the deteriorating state
of the current, traditional model of civil dispute resolution. Section II addresses the promise, but inadequacy of current alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures. We discuss our proposed reformation model in Section
III. In Section IV, we address key concerns arguably implicated by our reformation model. Section V rejects other proposed solutions to the problems
associated with the currently preferred, traditional jury trial model and discusses the reasons for such rejection. And we take a critical look at the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 in Section V. In the end, in Section VI, we are
so bold as to recommend to Congress the logical and essential steps that
need to be taken in the aftermath of the Civil Justice Reform Act experiment
now being conducted: true reform of our system of civil dispute resolution.
I.

THE MARKET BREAKDOWN OF THE TRADITIONAL
MODEL OF CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Our traditional civil dispute resolution regime is typified by market breakdown.I Justice costs too much and is unfairly distributed. The federal dis-

2
trict court, at least, is effectively off-limits to most members of society.

Given our Constitutional and democratic form of government, this is an unacceptable state of affairs.
The literature describing the modem market breakdown of the courts is
voluminous - and it is laden as much with statistics of cost and delay as
with sad tales of individual cases sabotaged by the system's collapse. A recent past chair of the ABA Section of Litigation, Theodore R. Tetzlaff, ar-

ticulated well some of our common concerns:
At least four critical questions require our immediate consideration if
the U.S. justice system is to survive in the 21st century: (1) how to
preserve and improve the jury trial system so that it can continue to
discharge its responsibilities under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments

to the U.S. Constitution and their state correlatives; (2) how to secure
1. See generally Michael E. Tigar, 2020 Vision: A Bifocal View, 74 JUDICATURE 89, 92
(1990) (comments of Professor and then-Chair of the ABA Section of Litigation Tigar, from
the May 18-22, 1990, The Future and the Courts Conference in San Antonio, Texas) ("In a
distressing number of cases ... the market behavior of legal services consumers is irrational in
two senses. It is irrational in terms of their own interest, which is a crucial market failure. It
is also irrational because a small minority of cases and lawyers are chewing up a grossly inflated amount of judicial resources.") [hereinafter Tigar, 2020 Vision].
2. See Theodore R. Tetzlaff, Opening Statement: Four Urgent Questions, 18 LITIG. 1, 2
(1991) (then-Chair of the ABA Section of Litigation Tetzlaff asking: "What middle-American
fails to be shocked at our 'regular hourly rates?' Which of us can afford to hire ourselves?")
(hereinafter Tetzlaff, Opening Statement]. Cf Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Consumer and the
Courts, 74 JUDICATURE 93, 94 (1990) (her informal survey of mostly judges and court personnel attending the May 18-22, 1990, The Future and the Courts Conference in San Antonio,
Texas asked: "If you had a dispute that you could not resolve amicably and you needed a
third party decisionmaker, would you go to court?" The overwhelming majority responded,
"No, not if I could possibly avoid it.").
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access for litigants, civil or criminal, to a truly satisfactory adversarial
hearing; (3) how to reorganize litigation processes and rules to respond
to the current forensic revolution in the creation and presentation of
evidence at trial; and (4) how to reduce the combativeness that now
mars relations between lawyers and clients, lawyers and their colleagues, and even lawyers and judges.... A broad, systematic, and fairminded approach is imperative if the U.S. adjudicatory3 mechanism is to
retain its credibility and efficacy in the next century.
We will but briefly summarize the monuments of current systemic collapse.
Between 1958 and 1988, the number of cases (both civil and criminal) filed
in the federal district courts trebled, and the number filed in the federal
courts of appeals increased by more than tenfold. 4 While the precise causes
of the modem federal court caseload surge are not fully understood, they
certainly include: the continued growth of federal law - in particular, the
creation of many new federal rights both by Congress and by judicial interpretation of the Constitution; and a variety of procedural developments such
as expanded use of class actions and "one-way" shifting of attorneys' fees.5
Also, overdiscovery by litigators has been identified as a major saboteur of
our traditional adversary system of civil dispute resolution. 6 Certainly, one
3. Tetzlaff, Opening Statement, supra note 2, at 1; see also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDI1990, S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.

CIARY, THE JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF

123 (1990) (reprinting Louis Harris & Assoc., Inc., Procedural Reform of the Civil Justice
System (1989)) (finding that 69% of the corporate counsel, 85% of the public interest litigators, 63% of the plaintiffs' litigators, 52% of the defense litigators, and 56% of the federal
trial judges surveyed agreed that transaction costs of federal litigation unreasonably impede
the use of the civil justice system by the ordinary citizen) [hereinafter Harris Survey].

4. Judicial Conf. of the United States,

REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY

COMM. 5 (April 2, 1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT]. In response to mounting
public and professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion, this committee of diverse membership was appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States at the direction of Congress. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (titled the "Federal Courts Study Act," effective
Jan. 1, 1989). The Committee was directed to "examine problems and issues currently facing
the courts of the United States" and to "develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal
Judiciary." Id. § 102(b)(1), (2). The Committee conducted a fifteen month study of the
problems of the federal courts and presented a report of its analysis and recommendations.
The Committee was chaired by Third Circuit Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., and its members were:
J. Vincent Aprile II, Esq.; United States District Court Judge Jose A. Cabranes; Washington
State Supreme Court Justice Keith M. Callow; First Circuit Judge Levin H. Campbell; Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Esq.; Senator Charles E. Grassley; Morris Harrell, Esq.; Senator
Howell Heflin; Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier; United States District Court Judge
Judith N. Keep; Brigham Young University President Rex E. Lee, Jr.; Representative Carlos
J. Moorhead; Diana Gribbon Motz, Esq.; and Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Mistakes Lawyers Make in Discovery, 15 LITIG. 31,
31 (Winter 1989) ("For many lawyers, discovery is a Pavlovian reaction."); Tigar, 2020 Vision,
supra note 1, at 92 (remarking on his perception of complex litigation in particular that, no
matter what amount of discovery and motions practice a case inherently requires, "[tihe 'bottom line' mentality of law firms means that if you have a litigation budget of $1 million, the
law firm will do that much discovery and then shamelessly come back for more."); see also

HarrisSurvey, supra note 3, at 128, 132; BROOKINGS INSTITUTION TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR
ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION (Brookings Institution 1989)
(task force chaired by Judge Robert Peckham. Judges John Nangle, Aubrey Robinson, and
Sarah Barker were the other members); Frank L. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U.L.
REV. 635 (1989).
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function of the excessive adversarialness associated with litigation today is
excessive delay.
As the Federal Courts Study Committee's Report of April 2, 1990 recognized: "whereas in 1960 it would have taken district courts only nine
months to dispose of all of their pending cases (if no new cases had been
filed) at their then rate of terminations, by 1989 this figure had risen to 11.7
months."' 7 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts released
figures in June of 1992 showing that more than 28,421 cases across the coun8
try were still awaiting trial more than three years after they were filed.
The modem caseload burden clearly exerts a negative impact upon the
quality of justice dispensed by the courts. This is something about which
people from all over Law's philosophical planet agree. 9
As Second Circuit Judge Jon 0. Newman has pointed out, the list of those
who suffer from our continued adherence to the traditional model of civil
dispute resolution is long.' 0 At the top of the list are the litigants who wait
years for their day in court. The list also includes conscripted participants in
the system:
jurors who wait for hours that turn into weeks, witnesses who give up
days of work to testify to facts of slight dispute and often less relevance,
business executives who endure days of deposition questioning that
yield little to the resolution of disputes in some of which their companies are not even involved. Perhaps the major impact is on the citizenry
in general, whose attitudes toward law and the legal system cannot help
7. STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. The corresponding rate of terminations for the courts of appeals are 7.2 months in 1960 and 9.2 months in 1989. Id.

8. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF March 12, 1991 and September 23-24, 1991 and 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, Appendix I
to 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (Detailed Statistical Tables), at 212 (Table C 6.
U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Pending, by District and Length of Time Pending).
9. See, e.g., Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 349 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting to underscore his disapproval of the Court's apparent reaction to its increasing caseload: "By deciding
cases summarily, without benefit of oral argument and full briefing, and often with only limited
access to, and review of, the record, this Court runs a great risk of rendering erroneous or illadvised decisions that may confuse the lower courts: there is no reason to believe that this
Court is immune from making mistakes, particularly under these kinds of circumstances.");
William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, in THE THIRD
BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1992, at 2 (Chief Justice Rehnquist's
remarks respecting the federal courts' caseload crisis: "Unless actions are taken to reverse
current trends, or slow them down considerably .... [t]he circumstances will lead judges to
have less of a sense of personal responsibility and accountability for the work they produce.
Unless checked, the result will be a degradation in the high quality of justice the nation has
long expected of the federal courts"); see also Carolyn D. King, A Matter of Conscience, 28
Hous. L. REV. 955, 963 (1991) ("[W]hen there is simply not enough judicial time to go
around, the temptation is to give shorter shrift to the cases brought by our most vulnerable
citizens.... In my view, no judge would specifically condone a two-track justice system: one
for the haves and one for the have-nots. The problem is that a two-track system can slip into
the modus operandi of even a conscientious but overloaded judge without the judge even being

aware of it.");

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:

CRISIS AND REFORM

132

(1985) (the amount of litigation is rapidly rising and "seriously threatening the quality of the
federal judiciary's output").
10. Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985) [hereinafter Newman, Rethinking Fairness].
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but be profoundly and negatively influenced by a litigation system that
voraciously consumes time and money."I
The system probably takes a toll on our international competitiveness too.
Foreign businesses are generally not hampered by the litigation morass too
often enveloping United States businesses. 12 This was one of the concerns
motivating creation of the legislative package of the President's Council on
Competitiveness, placed in the Access to Justice Act of 1992.'3 We know
that the regular expense of commercial litigation has become so great that
14
industry now looks seriously at alternatives to traditional litigation.
Under the continued reign of the traditional civil litigation model, there is
no reason to expect an abatement of these unwelcome attributes of civil dispute resolution. For example, the Administrative Office of the Federal
Courts forecasts that court of appeals caseloads (obviously, a function of
district court filings) will nearly triple in the next twenty-five years. 15 Meanwhile, filings in the district courts will triple. 16 And filings in bankruptcy
courts - whose decisions are, with a possible exception in the Ninth Circuit,
appealable to the district courts and on up the federal court hierarchy 7
should more than triple.'
11. Id.
12. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. and Kathleen L. Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America:

A Question of Parity With Our InternationalRivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 14 (1992)
(voicing concern about the adverse effects upon United States business in terms of international competitiveness of the United States' traditional civil dispute resolution model, and specifically comparing that model with comparable models in Germany and Japan: "even though
foreign businesses will be subject to the U.S. civil justice system for a small share of their
products and activities, American firms will be subject to it for most, if not all, of their products and activities. Absent reform of the American civil justice system then, American businesses will continue to incur disproportionately greater liability and legal costs than their
international competitors."); see also Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1, 1-2 (1990)
("every dollar American business spends on litigation and every hour United States executives
spend in depositions are money and time diverted from developing or producing better products at lower prices.") [hereinafter Kaufman, Reform].
13. S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also
A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS: AGENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991); 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. 1992) (codifying Exec.
Order No. 12778, which partially implemented Competitiveness Council proposals in federal
government litigation); Vice President J. Danforth Quayle, Prepared Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991).
14. See, e.g., Louis Fernandez, Let's Try Cooperation Instead of Confrontation, in BUSINESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 513, 513-19 (Kent Gilbreath ed., 2d ed. 1984). For a background on alternative dispute resolution in commercial contracts, see Robert Coulson,
BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW (American Arbitration Association

1980); Robert Coulson, BUSINESS ARBITRATION: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW (3d Ed.,
1986); Center for Public Resources, MINI-TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986).
15. STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see Gordan Bermant and Judy B. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth
Circuit'sExperience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 181-83 (1989) (describing the Ninth Circuit bankruptcy
appellate panels (BAPs), comprised of three bankruptcy judges to hear and decide initial appeals from decisions of the Ninth Circuit's bankruptcy courts).
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PROMISING BUT CURRENTLY INADEQUATE
ADR PROCEDURES

Certain fundamental changes to our civil litigation system are needed in
order to truly ensure that federal court litigants enjoy a system of civil dispute resolution unencumbered by undue expense and delay - one which
also maintains a level of fairness and reliability sufficient to instill public
confidence in the system. The legal profession must abandon the idea that
every method of deciding civil controversies that deviates from the traditional jury trial is relegated to "alternative" or "second-class" status. The
modern ADR movement has taught us some important lessons. Yet current
ADR programs and procedures are themselves inadequate to solve the
problems of our civil litigation system.
Well over 90% of all cases filed in the federal district courts never actually
go to trial. '8 While current ADR procedures often move settlement "up" in
time, they are too often deployed too late to be of much assistance in the
fight to reduce litigation cost and delay. Such procedures are many times
used after the modern, undisciplined pre-trial practices of lawyers have already run up a substantial bill and produced a significant delay in dispute
resolution. Thus, current ADR procedures often simply add a layer of litigation cost and delay.
Moreover, current ADR procedures are almost always accorded too little
binding authority; they are generally too little, in addition to being too often
too late. 19 For example, as the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania arbitration program was described:
The court administers the arbitration process ....

Informal hearings,

with relaxed rules of evidence, are conducted outside of a regular courtroom. After a hearing is concluded, the arbitrators deliberate for a
short time and return a judgment, which is communicated to the litigants within the next few days. If the parties accept the arbitrators'
verdict, it 20
is entered as a judgment of the court and is legally
enforceable.
After all this, if one of the litigants rejects the arbitrators' decision, she may
demand that the court schedule a full-blown traditional trial - i.e., with no
more justification than dissatisfaction with the results of the arbitrators' particular decision. The case is returned to the court's regular trial calendar.
And when the trial is held it is heard de novo - with no reference to either
18.
STATES

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

of March 12, 1991 and September 23-24, 1991 and 1991

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

Appendix I

to 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (Detailed Statistical Tables), at 206 (Table C 4.
U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken).
19.

See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ACTION COMMITTEE TO REDUCE COURT

COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 16 (1984) (noting that

when an ADR procedure designed to speed a case's development is voluntary, the procedure is
rarely used); Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Trial, 41 DUKE L.J. 806
(1992) [hereinafter Metzloff, Reconfiguring].
20. JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH ARBITRATION PROGRAM vii (Institute for Civil Justice 1983).
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the findings or the outcome of the earlier arbitration hearing. There sometimes exist cost-shifting disincentives to demanding trial de novo after an
arbitration ruling. But such disincentives are generally too insignificant to
21
truly discourage such demands.
Finally, private ADR procedures - even when effective - are not subsidized through tax dollars like court actions are. Sanford Jaffe, Director of
the Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at Rutgers University for one - has articulated his fear that stagnant, unresponsive courts will
become but "second-class" civil dispute resolution centers, while wealthy litigants will seek "first-class" alternative dispute resolution services in the pri22
vate sector.

Despite their current systematic failings, however, ADR procedures have
exhibited great promise. They can allow for the "steady, slow, unhurried"
attention essential to Article III adjudication. 23 And they are capable of
providing it at an affordable cost. Accordingly, ADR procedures, corrected
or reformed so as to maximize their potential, enjoy a prominent place
within the reformation model of public civil dispute resolution advocated in
this article.
III. THE NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE REFORMATION
MODEL OF CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The much-needed, reformed system of civil adjudication will require the
deployment of a battery of dispute resolution mechanisms. However, the
reformation model corrects several inadequacies associated with current alternative dispute resolution procedures. In our view, such corrections are
necessary if federal courts are truly to be considered "comprehensive justice
24
centers" - as we think they should be.
21. See, e.g.,

BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-AN-

NEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS

119 (1990) ("The programs do have disin-

centives to demands for trial de novo. At a minimum, all require payment of the arbitrators'
fees if the party who demands a trial de novo does not receive a judgment more favorable than
the arbitration award, and eight of the ten pilot courts require that these fees be posted along
with any demand [for trial de novo].") (hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION].

22. InstitutionalizingCourtADR Programs(panel discussion), in EMERGING ADR ISSUES
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 17, 18 (ABA Section of Litigation 1991) (summarizing

comments and noting comparison drawn between dispute resolution services and mail services,
with an emphasis upon development of the FAX and Federal Express).
23. Cf Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 445 (1982) ("Judges
alone are required to act with deliberation - a steady, slow, unhurried task.") [hereinafter
Resnik, ManagerialJudges].
24. As Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked recently:
On one end of the spectrum is a view of future federal courts as comprehensive justice centers, offering consumers a whole menu of dispute resolution procedures. Under this view federal judges would serve as a sort of managerial
maitre d', steering the litigant to the most appropriate form of dispute resolution. This would alter the traditional model wherein the federal system tolerated the excesses of the adversarial process, including long delays and high
expenses. Under this new model, the system would set up incentives - for
judges and litigants - to swiftly channel disputes into a whole host of alterna-

1912

SMU LAW REVIEW
A.

[Vol. 46

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE REFORMATION MODEL

The following are fundamental components of the reformation model of
civil dispute resolution.

1. The System Must Be Public
The courthouse stands as a symbol that in our country it is deemed important that there be a place dedicated to ensuring fairness and civility in societal arrangements. The fact that it is set apart conveys, in bricks and mortar,
the Constitutional concept of separation of powers. What transpires in the
courthouse does not take place behind locked doors, but rather, is available
for public consumption with the therapeutic effect of such openness. 25 The
business conducted in the courts is not only subject to legal review within the

court system; it is subject as well to the higher review of the people who
come, watch and enter judgment on the system. We submit that such openness has had a soothing effect on the national psyche and that it has made a
not insignificant contribution to the survival of the Republic. As Senator

Daniel Patrick Moynihan said recently upon the groundbreaking for a new
federal courthouse in White Plains, New York:
[O]urs is the only civilization in the world where there is something
conspicuous and central to our urban arrangements called a courthouse. Think about it. When you wander across Europe looking at
cathedrals, do you ever see a courthouse? No. You can walk around
Canada, and you will not see a courthouse, a place of justice, a hallowed
place which we uniquely set aside in our arrangements. It speaks well
of us. It speaks to the world about how things can be different. It re-

minds us how very, very fragile any society is, and
how strong the
26
courts have to be to ensure its continued strength.

tive dispute resolution options, even though traditional adversarial justice would
still be available.
This model contemplates that the majority of entrants into the federal legal
system neither expect nor need extensive pre-trial procedures and a full-blown
jury trial. Instead, the model posits that many litigants may have a greater need
for an inexpensive and prompt resolution of their disputes, however rough and
ready, than an unaffordable and tardy one, however close to perfection.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Kastenmeier Lecture, University of Wisconsin, Madison (Sept. 15, 1992). See also generally Gladys Kessler and Linda J. Finkelstein,
The Evolution of the Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. L. REV. 577 (1988); Access to Justice
Act of 1992, S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (President's
Council on Competitiveness conception of the "multi-door courthouse").
25. "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis
D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (10th ed. 1934).
See also H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431, 433
(1986) (noting that some settlements may well be contrary to the public interest, denying the
opportunity for court-enunciated guidance of future conduct and concealing from the public

improper practices and dangerous products).
26. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Speech at White Plains, New York (December 4,
1992) (remarks at the ground-breaking for a new United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York) (copy of remarks on file with SMU Law Review).
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A ManagerialMust: Early JudicialInvolvement (Tracking) With a
Meaningful Opportunityfor Litigants to Be Heard

Future civil dispute resolution in the federal courts must in fact be courtdriven. It is critical to our highly evolved system of civil dispute resolution
that judges play a role significantly more active - or managerial - than the
one they have traditionally assumed. 27 The traditional role of the judge in
our adversarial system of justice has been akin to an umpire - a judge who
participates minimally in the pre-trial process. 28 In recent years, however,
federal district court judges have, out of necessity, assumed a more managerial role in the pre-trial stages of cases. They have been taking on an increasing amount of responsibility for assisting litigants in getting their cases into
and through the system. These judges have demanded more responsibility
from the lawyers and litigants commanding scarce litigant and judicial
29
resources.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 institutionalizes managerial judging
measures. 30 The reformation model we are advocating calls for more measures of this sort. Although such additional institutionalization of managerial
judging measures would move our system closer to an inquisitorial system of
civil dispute resolution, these measures would not turn our essentially adversarial system into an essentially inquisitorial one. Litigants will not lose control over those aspects of their cases that are essential to an adversarial
31
system of justice.
27. See generally Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as Case Manager: The New Role
in Guiding a Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Robert F. Peckham,
A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985); Alvin B. Rubin, The
Managed Calendar: Some PragmaticSuggestions About Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determinationof Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 135 (1978); William B.
Schwarzer, ManagingCivil Litigation: The Trial Judge'sRole, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978). Of
course, litigators will need to adjust, or upgrade the adversarial weapons in their arsenals as
well. See Edward F. Sherman, Reshaping the Lawyer's Skills for Court-SupervisedADR, 51
TEX. B.J. 47, 47-49 (1988). Fortunately, law schools have started telling this to the country's
future litigators. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET. AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 414-24 (West 1989) [hereinafter MARCUS ET AL.].
28. Cf Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975).
29. See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra note 23, at 391-403 (identifying reasons for the
emergence of the managerial judge: (1) changes in the role of judges necessitated by procedural innovations (e.g., the creation and development of pretrial discovery rights) and the
articulation of (other, substantive) new rights and remedies; and (2) changes initiated by judges
themselves in response to rising workload pressures). It is probably most obvious that managerial judging assists litigants in getting their cases through the system. But given the scarcity
of judicial resources, when judges ensure that cases do not linger unduly in the system, they are
also making room for more cases to come into the system.
30. See generally infra at Section V.C.
3 1. In a purely adversarialsystem, the litigants are in charge; they control the pace and
shape of litigation, investigate, prepare, and present evidence and arguments to a neutral, third
party decisionmaker. See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra note 23, at 380-381, n.23, and
authorities cited therein. In a purely inquisitorialsystem, the judge is in charge, actively seeking evidence from both sides, directing the litigants' actions in the litigation, and providing
commentary on the quality of the case, including likely outcome. However, as Professor Resnik has noted, the actual demarcation between inquisitorial and adversarial proceedings is not
a bright line. Id. at 445 n.275 (citing John H. Merryman, On the Conversion (and Divergence)
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Early judicial involvement is essential to the effectiveness of the reformation model. It is contemplated that a case will be scheduled for a trackplacement hearing, or management conference soon after issue is joined.
The judicial officer should provide counsel and litigants an opportunity for
meaningful input into the court's tracking decision. Because of the early
procedural juncture of the hearing, the court's tracking decision clearly must
be made in light of somewhat limited information. Still, among the guidelines for the court to follow in it's tracking determination are: (1) apparent
case complexity (e.g., the number of parties involved, the general subject
matter of the litigation, and the anticipated type and volume of evidence); (2)
the apparent need for information exchange (disclosure) and/or discovery,
and the evident necessary extent of such; (3) the relative financial resources
of the parties; (4) the degree to which the case appears to possess public
policy externalities; and (5) whether the case involves novel questions of law
or fact. 32 The court's tracking decision, and the reasons underlying it,
should be placed in the record - and this adjudication should be reviewable
under the abuse of discretion standard.
3.

There Must Exist a Presumption of Finality

Because of the fair and reliable, public and formal nature of the procedures under the reformation model, it is proper - and necessary - that a
presumption of finality attach to whatever decision is reached through a
non-traditional track proceeding.
4.

The TraditionalJury Trial Must Be Preserved; and a Second, Even
More Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard Needs to Be
Providedfor Litigants Seeking to Demonstrate Their
Entitlement to a TraditionalJury Trial

Access to the traditional paradigm of the formalistic jury trial is ensured
when justified. Of course, a case might be placed on the traditional track at
the initial hearing. But if a case is not traditionally tracked originally, after a
decision is reached through a non-traditional track the litigants should be
afforded a second procedural safeguard: another meaningful opportunity to
be heard about why they are yet entitled to a traditional trial.
The second hearing is even more meaningful than the first, because at this
point the participants are able to view the case through the prism of all the
information developed during the previous proceedings: disclosure; discovof the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387 (1981); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1009 (1974)).
32. Cf generally 28 U.S.C. § 652(b) (1988) (exempting from compulsory arbitration in the

ten congressionally authorized pilot districts for court-annexed arbitration those claims based
on constitutional violations and all civil rights claims); 28 U.S.C. § 652(c) (1988) (requiring the
ten pilot districts to establish local rules for a system for exempting, sua sponte or by motion of
a party, any case from arbitration in which the objectives of arbitration would not be realized:
(1) because the case involves complex or novel legal issues; (2) because legal issues
predominate over factual issues; or (3) for other good cause).
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ery (when appropriate); the information presented at the non-traditional
track proceeding, as well as the result reached in that proceeding. With all
of this information, the court can undertake a thorough cost/benefit-fairness
analysis of whether the case warrants the additional litigant and court resources implicated by the post-decision, traditional litigation. Most basically, this post-decision hearing operates as an "exemption procedure," or
safeguard, for any cases that might have been inappropriately tracked initially. The court should reconsider the factors analyzed at the tracking conference. Also, the court should consider whether it is likely that a result
substantially different from that reached through the non-traditional track
will be reached by allowing the case to continue through an additional, traditional litigation track.
However, the court's post-decision, traditional trial entitlement analysis is
guided by a presumption of finality in the decision already rendered pursuant to the non-traditional track. The litigant seeking to consume still more
(litigant and judicial) resources must overcome this presumption. In addition, a network of incentives and disincentives should operate to discourage
litigants from challenging the presumption. Thus, post-decision challenges
should be relatively few.
B.

A

SPECIFIC PROTOTYPE OF THE REFORMATION MODEL

The specific prototype of the reformation model described next is simply
one of the many that could be developed according to the essential elements
just discussed. We emphasize that the following version of the reformation
model is not intended to be definitive; it should not be seen to foreclose other
essentially consistent reformation model prototypes.
1. Litigation Track I
At the lowest level of the evolved system's sliding scale of litigation options, or tracks, the litigants would suffer no detriment for lacking lawyers as
advocates. There would be no complex formalisms to burden the free communication of grievance and resolution. In essence, claims and defenses
could be presented by litigants - without the necessity of counsel - to a
judicial officer or to a professional, non-judicial decisionmaker. The rules of
evidence and the rules of civil procedure would not apply, and the case could
be presented by permitting the litigants and any witnesses to tell their stories. The decisionmaker's role would be closer to "inquisitorial" than has
been traditional in our system, in order to assure the full development of
relevant facts.
2.

Litigation Track II

At the next level of litigation, claims and defenses could be presented to
judicial or non-judicial decisionmakers, either individually or sitting as a
panel. The case could be presented in summary form, by live testimony, or
by affidavit. The proceeding would take place after court-ordered, case-tailored disclosure and exchange of essential information by the parties.
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This litigation track most resembles what is now known as court-annexed
arbitration. Court-annexed arbitration is generally expected to take place
33
early in the litigation, with little discovery.
3. Litigation Track III
Litigation Track III permits the submission of claims and defenses to a
judge or jury without the cost and delay associated with the traditional jury
trial. The proceeding would take place after court-ordered disclosure and
the exchange by the litigants of essential information (again, tailored to the
needs of the case). The case could be presented in summary form, by live
testimony, or by affidavit. It is contemplated that each side would be subject
to court-imposed presentation time limitations dependent upon the complexity of the case.
If the submissions are to a jury, this litigation track most resembles what
is now known as the summary jury trial (SJT) developed by Judge Thomas
D. Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio - except that this track is
expected to take place early in the litigation, with a limited amount of discovery after initial disclosure.3 4 Professor Thomas B. Metzloff has written
recently about the evident potential inhering in binding SJTs - potential
reflected in findings from an experimental program implemented by the
North Carolina state court system. 35 He reports that the North Carolina
litigants reacted more positively to binding SJTs than they did to non-binding ones, and he argues that further attention to the SJT's potential as a
binding process is warranted by the results of the North Carolina state court
experiment: "Although at first blush binding SJTs may seem inconsistent
with its purpose and structure, a binding approach overcomes most of the
current criticisms of the SJT. Accordingly, it offers a promising ADR opportunity for resolving certain high-stakes disputes. ' '3 6 We agree.
4. Litigation Track IV
Herein lies the traditional jury trial conception of civil dispute resolution.
However, this traditional trial track should itself be reformed pursuant to a
significant, comprehensive Civil Justice Reform Act plan controlling the
37
type and extent of discovery available in particular cases.
5. Mediation's OverarchingAppropriateness
Finally, mediation -

court-annexed or voluntary -

should be available

33. See generally MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, supra note 21 (overview of court-annexed arbitration as it is used in 10 federal district courts).
34. Respecting the current configuration of the SJT, see generally Thomas D. Lambros
and Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980); Thomas D.
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103
F.R.D. 461 (1984); and S. Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CINN. L. REV. 829

(1986).
35. See generally Metzloff, Reconfiguring, supra note 19.

36. Id.
37. See discussion infra Section V.C.
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for any case, regardless of its litigation track assignment. However, in order
to avoid the traditional "too late" cost inefficiency weakness of mediationassisted case terminations, mediation should be utilized early in the reformation model process - after disclosure has taken place but before pre-trial
process costs have taken their now too customary toll.
6. Incentive/Disincentive and Presumption Framework
Incentives inhere in the reformation model - in terms of reduced cost
and delay - for litigants to be satisfied with the essentially fair, reliable
decision produced pursuant to the non-traditional litigation track to which
their case has been assigned. Relative cost and delay also work as disincentives for litigants to seek more process after the presumptively correct decision is rendered pursuant to a non-traditional track proceeding. It appears
quite likely that most litigants who have been originally placed on a nontraditional track will not consider the additional process (benefit) of a traditional trial worth the additional cost and delay inherent in such litigation.
This seems especially true given that the litigant would have to overcome a
presumption against entitlement to such a trial before she could start expending the additional time and money associated with the traditional trial
itself.
We have considered that another, more stringent disincentive could be
added: a litigation cost-shifting measure - similar to those currently
provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, "English Rule"-inspired
local court rules, and court-annexed arbitration programs. 38 But we do not
think a more stringent, "pure disincentive" is necessary - in light of our
model's presumption of finality, and the time and cost incentives/disincentives at work within the model.
C.

MORE SPECIFIC: HOW A CASE MIGHT PROCEED THROUGH OUR
REFORMATION MODEL PROTOTYPE

As stated above, under the reformation model, a case should be scheduled
for a litigation track-placement hearing or management conference soon after issue is joined. The judicial officer provides the parties a fair opportunity
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 68; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DisTRICT OF TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN PURSUANT TO
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 10 (Article Six: Miscellaneous Matters, (9)) (defining the "litigation costs" that can be shifted under the plan - if an offer of judgment is refused

and the refusing party fails to better the offer through trial by at least 10% - as costs directly
related to preparing the case for trial, as well as actual trial expenses such as reasonable attorneys' fees, deposition costs and fees for expert witnesses); John L. Barkai and Gene Kassebaum, Using Court-Annexed Arbitration to Reduce Litigant Costs and to Increase the Pace of
Litigation, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 54 (1989) (describing provision of a Hawaii state program,
whereby, if the arbitration award is not bettered through a trial de novo by at least 15%, legal
fees and costs up to $5,000 may be shifted against the party demanding the trial);
MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, supra note 21, at 119 ("The programs do
have disincentives to demands for trial de novo. At a minimum, all require payment of the
arbitrators' fees if the party who demands a trial de novo does not receive a judgment more

favorable than the arbitration award, and eight of the ten pilot courts require that these fees be
posted along with any demand [for trial de novo].").
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for meaningful input into the court's tracking decision. Apparent case complexity, need for information exchange and/or discovery, relative financial
resources of the parties, public policy, case externalities, and whether the
case involves novel questions of law or fact, are critical considerations guiding the court's tracking decision.
For example, at the early tracking conference, the court might decide after
hearing from the litigants and/or their counsel that the case does not appear
to present novel questions of law or fact, exists in a simple one-on-one, adversarial posture, and is not especially complex in terms of subject matter or
particular issues. The court might also decide after input from the litigants
and/or their counsel that the case really only requires the depositions of the
parties and the disclosure between the parties of information bearing significantly on the claims and defenses of the litigants. The court might then
decide to place the case in Litigation Track II, with the case to be presented
to a single judicial officer through a combination of live testimony and
affidavits.
As we have said, this track most resembles what is known now as courtannexed arbitration. It is likely that the litigants will be quite satisfied with
the process they receive pursuant to this non-traditional litigation track. As
the Federal Judicial Center reported to Congress (in fulfillment of the former's obligation to evaluate the performance of the mandatory, court-annexed, non-binding arbitration programs statutorily created in 1988):
Eighty percent of all parties in cases mandatorily referred to arbitration
agreed that the procedures used to handle their cases were fair ...
Among parties who had prior trial experience, 84% agreed that the
procedures were fair. Furthermore, half of all parties who participated
in an arbitration hearing selected arbitration as their preferred method
of decision making when asked to choose among judges, juries, arbitration, or "makes no difference." ' 39
In addition to an appreciation for the cost and time savings inhering in civil
dispute resolution programs comprised of simpler procedures, these findings
may reflect recognition of at least some possibility that there can exist serious shortfalls in the rationality of the process by which juries reach verdicts
in a traditional trial. The findings may also reflect an appreciation for the
facts: (1) that arbitration, like other ADR techniques, often affords litigants
more of an opportunity to participate directly in dispute resolution than do
relatively alienating traditional trials; and (2) that compared to traditional
trials, ADR processes expose litigants to substantially less stress over a
shorter period of time.4°
39. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, supra note 21, at 119-120.
40. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten
Important Values, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 303 (identifying - in addition to the relatively low
transaction costs and delay - the low-stress, litigant empowerment, and catharsis values inhering in three different court-sponsored ADR programs in the Northern District of California: (1) Magistrate Judge-hosted settlement conferences, (2) early neutral evaluation, and (3)
mandatory, non-binding arbitration); E. ALLAN LIND ET. AL, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE:
TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SET-
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Suppose that in the case we have described the losing party decided, despite the presumption of finality and the cost associated with challenging the
presumption (not to mention the cost associated with an additional, traditional trial), that seeking a traditional trial was in her best interest. She
might think, for example, that while the case may not be complex or novel in
any sense, it does "deserve" more discovery and fact-finding than was provided by the court's initial tracking of the case. Were this party to demand a
hearing on the issue of her entitlement to a post-decision, traditional trial,
the court would conduct the hearing and listen to the arguments for and
against the expenditure of additional litigant and court resources on the case.
The court might decide - based upon the arguments at the hearing and
the record from the earlier, Litigation Track II proceedings - that there is
no substantial likelihood that a significantly different result would be
reached through a traditional trial. Moreover, the court might find that the
demanding party is attempting to "bully" the other with her superior financial and legal resources. Under such circumstances, the court could rule
that the demanding party had not demonstrated her entitlement to the traditional trial.
Alternatively, it might become clear to the court at the entitlement hearing that, while the case was not mistracked, and despite substantial disparity
in resources between the litigants, the potential for the traditional litigation
to generate a significantly different outcome is strong enough that the demanding party should be granted entitlement to a post-decision, traditional
trial.
Whatever the court's adjudication at the post-decision, traditional trial
entitlement hearing, the ruling and the reasons underlying it must be placed
in the record. The court's decision in this respect should be reviewable according to the clearly erroneous standard. This same standard of review
should apply to the final, appealable decision rendered through any nontraditional track.
IV.

AN ANTICIPATION OF CONCERNS ARGUABLY
IMPLICATED BY THE REFORMATION MODEL

A.

RESPECTING REASONED ADJUDICATION AND REVIEW

The lack of standards and the lack of a system of review have been the
TLEMENT CONFERENCES 79 (1989) (Institute for Civil Justice) (study of state court litigation)

("court-annexed arbitration appears to give both plaintiffs and defendants what they want
from the judicial process."). But see id. ("[slettlement conferences tended to provoke less
favorable reactions than did trial and arbitration hearings. Perceptions of fairness were markedly lower for litigants whose cases were subject to settlement conferences ....").Cf.Robert
A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice. Jurisdictional
Principlesfor Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 918-920 (["The societal goal of ensuring
that its governing institutions and structures appear legitimate in the eyes of its members] is
essentially a process-oriented and not an outcome-oriented goal. Furtherance of the goal depends on the party's experience of the dispute handling process, not necessarily on the outcome of that process.") [hereinafter Baruch Bush, Process Choice]; see also Raymond J.
Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217 (1989).
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primary concerns expressed about management-oriented civil dispute resolution models like the one we have constructed. In her 1982 Harvard Law
Review article on managerial judges, Professor Judith Resnik discussed her
concern: "Proponents of management may be forgetting the quintessential
judicial obligations of conducting a reasoned inquiry, articulating the reasons for decision, and subjecting those reasons to appellate review - characteristics that have long defined judging and distinguished it from other
tasks."'4 1 We agree with Professor Resnik that these are vital characteristics
of any just system of civil dispute resolution. And our reformation model
ensures that litigants will have their cases heard under a regime of fair, reasoned, public inquiry - including appellate review applying basic principles
of freedom and fairness at numerous procedural stages. 42
As we have discussed, the court's initial tracking decision takes place
within the framework of a public, fair hearing, at which the litigants are
afforded the opportunity to argue for case-placement on the litigation track
they think appropriate. The court's tracking decision is on the record, is
guided by set principles of fair consideration, and should be subject to abuse
of discretion review. The litigation track proceedings themselves - in the
courthouse, on the record, and open to the public - each meet at least the
minimum requirements of procedurally just, deliberate, adversarial adjudication. The hearing to determine whether a litigant initially placed on a nontraditional track can overcome the presumption against her entitlement to a
traditional jury trial also takes place in the courthouse, on the record, and in
public - and again, the court's decision is adjudicated according to set principles of fairness. This decision, and the final judgments rendered pursuant
to any of the litigation tracks, should be subject to review under the clearly
erroneous standard.
In short, the reformation model's procedural regime should not generate
an onslaught of new appellate issues. But it should answer important questions about reasoned adjudication and reviewability raised by scholars in
similar contexts. Moreover, this procedural regime presents an important
question: which model of civil dispute resolution threatens to turn our
courthouses into Dickensian Bleak Houses43 - the traditional model or the
reformation model proposed by this article?
B.

RESPECTING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY
IN CIVIL CASES

The above-described, evolved civil dispute resolution model should, at
least, go far toward fulfilling the fundamental premise underlying the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Justice Reform Act of
41. Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 23, at 431.
42. Cf Tigar, 2020 Vision, supra note 1,at 91 ("I yield to no one in my regard for alternative dispute methods, arbitration, mediation, and informal resolution. But the perceived legitimacy of such devices - against a backdrop of hundreds of years of popular demand for justice
- depends vitally upon the existence of a system of review that will apply basic principles of
freedom and fairness.").
43. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
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1990." The reformation model is typified by increased information and by
increased public, formal hearings for litigants - all in order to increase actual access to fair, affordable and reliable, public civil dispute resolution. We
recognize, however, that the highly evolved civil dispute resolution system
posited by this article arguably implicates the Seventh Amendment.
According to the Seventh Amendment:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court45of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
The right of trial by jury is clearly crucial to our common notion of a just
system of civil dispute resolution. 46 But in this aspect of civil litigation too,
we must strike a healthy balance of interests; a balance sensitive to current
demands placed upon vital societal interests as well as to the peculiar interests of those individuals who happen to be standing at the front of the line
into the courthouse.
While by its terms ("the right of trial by jury shall be preserved"), the
Seventh Amendment might appear to call for static, historical inquiry, the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence is typified by a pragmatic, evolving approach
to Seventh Amendment issues. Essentially, the Court's Seventh Amendment
caselaw acknowledges the truth recognized by Professor Austin Wakeman
Scott in his 1918 HarvardLaw Review article about history, change and the
Seventh Amendment: if the institution of trial by jury is to survive, it must
adapt to societal needs of the present and the future. 4 7 "This means that it
must be something more than a bulwark against tyranny and corruption: it
must be an efficient instrument in the administration of justice."'48 Both his44. As Judge Kaufman has pointed out, "faced with ever-burgeoning caseloads and essentially static resources, the nation's courts fall further and further behind the promise of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 'the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action'." Kaufman, Reform, supra note 12, at I (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1). The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 takes as its objectives: "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases
on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes." Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471
(Supp. Ill1991) (emphasis added).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
46. See generally JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); Harry Kalven, The
Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964). See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 312 (4th ed. 1841) ("I think that the practical intelligence and the

political good sense of the Americans are mainly attributable to the long use which they have
made of the jury in civil causes."); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
347-50 (7th ed. 1956) (describing the basic advantages of the civil jury as: (1) the jury can
bring "average common sense" to bear upon facts; (2) jury findings do not result in the creation of binding precedent - and thus, juries can decide "hard" cases without making "bad"
law; (3) a jury helps to preserve the dignity of the bench by relieving the judge of the responsibility of decision; (4) the jury members themselves are educated by their exposure to and participation in the administration of justice; and (5) the jury makes the law intelligible by
constantly bringing rules of the law to the touchstone of their collective common sense).
47. Austin W. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV.
669, 691 (1918) [hereinafter Scott, Trial by Jury].
48. Id.
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torical and modem analyses illuminate the pragmatic nature of the Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury.
Historical inquiry reveals that the streamlined, non-jury, public civil dispute resolution format is by no means new. A concern that access to courts
of general jurisdiction was beyond the means of poor plaintiffs with small
claims can be traced back in English legal history at least to the fifteenth
century. 49 History teaches us that there were various special, juryless, small
claims tribunals in England and the American colonies, territories, and
states before 1791.50 Indeed, in the years preceding 1850, a litigant was not

necessarily "entitled" to a jury even if the claim at issue was legal and could
alternatively have been brought in a common law court and heard by a
jury. 51 As Professor Margreth Barrett has discussed, under the English
system:
when remedies were available simultaneously in both [the common law
court and a special small claims tribunal], the prevailing practice not
only permitted summary relief in the juryless small claims tribunals but
strongly encouraged it: in some jurisdictions there were laws expressly
penalizing the litigant who persisted in seeking the common-law procedure for a small monetary claim. The very purpose of small claims
courts was to provide the kind of relief the common-law courts provided -

money judgments - through a procedure simplified to accom52

modate the small amount-in-controversy.
The cost/benefit-fairness intent was "to provide speedy, inexpensive, and informal disposition of small actions through simple proceedings conducted
with an eye on compromise and conciliation."' 53 The court was designed
particularly to help the poorer litigant. It was thought that the securing of
justice for ordinary citizens accomplished through the streamlined resolution procedures meaningfully demonstrated the integrity of the judicial system. 54 The small claims movement led to the statutory creation of a small
debt court in London in 1605.55 In 1846, the new county courts were cre56

ated in England.
Thus, under a historical approach to Seventh Amendment issues, it appears that this early practice of resolving small claims without a jury would
justify comparable juryless procedures today. 57 Indeed, in the 1899 case of
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof the Supreme Court found that a long line of
49. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 186-187 (7th ed.
rev. 1956).
50. See RoscOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 150-56, 245-46 (1940).
51. See generally Margreth Barrett, The Constitutional Right to Jury Trial: A Historical
Exception for Small Monetary Claims, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 125, 154 (1987) (discussing state
small claims procedures specifically, and advocating - through historical and cost-benefit

analyses -

a jury trial exception for small claims cases) [hereinafter Barrett, Historical

Exception].

52. Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Carl R. Pagter et al., Comment, The CaliforniaSmall Claims Court, 52 CAL. L. REV.
876, 876-77 (1964).
54. Id. at 877.
55. Id.at 876.
56. Barrett, HistoricalException, supra note 51 at 138-39.
57. Cf generally id.
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decisions in the original states maintained the position that the Constitutional right of trial by jury is not infringed by a statute: (1) setting the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in actions at law higher
than it was when the particular constitution was adopted; (2) allowing a trial
by jury for the first time upon appeal from the judgment of the justice of the
peace; and (3) requiring of the appellant a bond with surety to prosecute the
appeal and to pay the judgment of the appellate court. 58 In Hof, the Court
concluded that the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury "does not prescribe at what stage of an action a trial by jury must, if demanded, be had; or
what conditions may be imposed upon the demand of such a trial,consistently
with preserving the right to it." 59 Accordingly, the Court held: "The legislature, in distributing the judicial power ...must have a considerable discretion ... provided always the right of trial by jury is not taken away in any
case in which it is secured by the Constitution. '" 60
More recent Supreme Court decisions further demonstrate the pragmatic,
evolving nature of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. In the 1959 case,
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover the Court broke from its past practice of
applying strictly historical analysis to Seventh Amendment questions. 6' The
Beacon Theatres Court established the necessity of taking into account the
merger of law and equity, and other changes effected by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, when analyzing whether a party is entitled to the right of
trial by jury - albeit it then did so in the course of declaring that the jury
trial right is to be preservedfor an individualcase whereverpossible.62 While
the Court's 1970 case, Ross v. Bernhard, is partly rooted in historical analysis, it at least intimates movement away from that base in its statement that
"the practical abilities and limitations of juries" is a factor relevant to the
determination of the Constitutional right of trial by jury. 63 Before Ross, it
had not been thought that the presence of the Constitutional right of trial by
jury was to be determined by an assessment of a jury's capabilities except in
the case of an accounting. In 1973's Colgrove v. Battin, the Court upheld the
58. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899) (discussing inter alia Keddie v.
Moore, (2 Mur.), 41, 45 (N.C. 1811) (North Carolina Supreme Court upholding 1803 state
statute raising the pecuniary limit of justice of the peace jurisdiction from twenty shillings and
under, to thirty pounds and under - "subject nevertheless to right of appeal" to a court of
record - against attack as violative of the 1776 North Carolina constitutional provision for
trial by jury)). "In passing upon those [Seventh Amendment] questions, the judicial decisions
and the settled practice in the several States are entitled to great weight, inasmuch as the
constitutions of all of them had secured the right of trial by jury in civil actions ....
" Id. at
23. It should be noted that trials before justices of the peace were of a quite different character
from the common law trial by jury. "A justice of the peace, having no other powers than those
conferred by Congress ...was not, properly speaking, a judge, or his tribunal a court; least of
all, a court of record." Id. at 38.
59. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
61. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
62. Id. at 509-10; see also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,' 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (clarifying in
this respect the significance of Beacon Theatres); cf. John C. McCoid II, Procedural Reform
and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 11 (1967) (asserting that Beacon Theatres "fits well with the conception of the Constitution
as a durable document providing continuingly useful standards for an evolving society.").
63. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
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Constitutionality of a District of Montana local rule providing for a sixmember jury in all civil cases; and in so doing, reaffirmed that while the
Seventh Amendment protects the right of trial by jury, it does not enshrine
"the various incidents of trial by jury." 64 And in 1979's Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, the Court held that a defendant who has had issues of fact
adjudicated adversely to it in an equitable action may, consistent with the
Seventh Amendment, be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new
party. And the Court granted trial courts broad discretion to determine
65
when to apply offensive collateral estoppel.
Simply put, our reformation model does not unreasonably obstruct the
right of trial by jury, let alone "strip" parties of their Constitutional right of
a jury trial. 66 Rather, under this model, the right of trial by jury ispreserved
for and rationally, fairly distributed to those cases entitled to it. There is
nothing new or particularly onerous about our entitlement theory of the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury. Any litigant must already jump
through the entitlement hoops of actually filing a lawsuit with the court,
requesting a jury trial in accordance with the federal and applicable local
rules, and surviving possible collateral estoppel, qualified immunity, dismissal, and summary judgment challenges to the merits of his suit - in order to
realize his individual right of trial by jury. 6 7 And the cost/benefit-fairness
analysis we have described concerning the appropriate amount of litigant
and judicial resources warranted by a case is similar to the sorts of decisions
routinely made by judges - e.g., whether to certify a class, or whether a
litigant is substantially likely to prevail on the merits of a claim so as to be
entitled to a temporary restraining order. The reformation model simply
imposes additional rational and fair adjudicatory guidelines for distribution
of the Seventh Amendment right of trial by jury in order to ensure a vitally
important public end: the conservation and rational, fair distribution of
scarce litigant and judicial resources (including the right of trial by jury).
64. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1973).
65. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that the plaintiffs in a
securities fraud action could use offensive collateral estoppel to rely on the findings of an earlier suit brought by the SEC against the defendants).
66. Cf generally Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989) (Congress
"lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right of the Constitutional right
to a trial by jury. As we recognized in Atlas Roofing, to hold otherwise would be to permit
Congress to eviscerate the Seventh Amendment's guarantee by assigning to administrative
agencies or courts of equity all causes of action not grounded in state law, whether they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of common-law forebears.")
(citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
457-58 (1977)).
67. See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) ("[M]any
procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury's historic domain
have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.") (citations omitted respecting directed verdict, the retrial of damages questions, and summary judgment); id. at
337 ("The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas defining the scope
of the jury's function, has evolved since 1791. . . . [T]hese developments are not repugnant to
the Seventh Amendment simply for the reason that they did not exist in 1791.").
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RESPECTING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS IN CIVIL CASES

There exists a clear body of law delineating a Constitutional right of access in criminal cases and cases brought by prisoners. 68 But the general
existence of a Constitutional right of access in civil cases is much more muddied. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court, in dicta at least, described
the right of access to the courts as a fundamental right within the protection
of the First Amendment. 69 And yet this approach to questions of access in
civil cases seems to have been abandoned in recent years, in favor of a property analysis. 70 In the 1982 case, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., the
Supreme Court held that one has a due process property interest in a civil
cause of action. 7' The due process right articulated by the Court's jurisprudence appears to be simply "the right to pass through the courthouse door
and present one's claim for judicial determination. ' 72 The reformation
model ensures access to the courts for fair, affordable and reliable civil dispute resolution.
An equal protection analysis also affords the legislature significant latitude
in regulating judicial proceedings. As Judge Irving R. Kaufman recognized,
access to the courts has been afforded heightened protection only when the
right asserted in the underlying action is itself fundamental and when there
is no other forum in which that right can be enforced.73 The "rational basis
68. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, jail officials must take affirmative steps to assure inmates meaningful access to the courts; noting that adequate law libraries are one Constitutionally acceptable
method of assuring such access to the courts, but that other alternatives could meet Constitutional standards as well); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees indigent individuals a right to provision of counsel in order to appeal a criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that due
process and equal protection were violated when indigent criminal defendants could not obtain
adequate appellate review because they were unable to pay for the transcripts of their trials).
69. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1971) ("collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within
the protection of the First Amendment"); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) ("it would be destructive of rights of association and of
petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust
laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate
their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests
vis-a-vis their competitors."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) ("litigation may
well be the sole practicable avenue open to a [racial] minority to petition for redress of
grievances").
70. See generally Martin D. Brier, Comment, Economics Awry: Using Access Fees for
Caseload Diversion, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1990) [hereinafter Brier, Comment, Economics Awry].
71. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
72. Los Angeles County Bar Assoc. v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1992); see Logan,
455 U.S. at 437. ("nothing we have said entitles every civil litigant to a hearing on the merits
in every case. The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right
to adjudication ....") (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378 (1971), for the proposition that what the Due Process Clause does require is an
opportunity, granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case).
73. Kaufman, Reform, supra note 12, at 25-26 (discussing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971)); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977) ("this Court has never held

SMU LAW REVIEW

1926

[Vol. 46

test" should govern the reformation model's procedures. 74 The measures
imposed by the reformation model clearly accord with this standard of equal
protection analysis.
V.

OTHER PROPOSED PROBLEM-SOLVING MODELS

In order to fully appreciate why the highly-evolved model posited by this
article is appropriate, one must understand the inadequacies of other proposed problem-solving models. In this section, we will discuss: (1) why we
reject other problem-solving models; and (2) why the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 is but the first step toward necessary, true reformation of the
country's civil dispute resolution system.
A.

THE SUPPLY-SIDE PROBLEM-SOLVING PRETENDER:

INCREASE

JUDICIAL RESOURCES

There might appear to be a ready solution to problems associated with
modern litigation - one that does not require significant reformation measures. There is an obvious temptation to simply call for an increase in the
number of judges and other court personnel in order to supply the rising
demand for civil dispute resolution. Indeed, in an effort to cope with the
ever-expanding universe of civil case filings, Congress has significantly expanded the number of federal district court and appellate judgeships. 75 But
the universe of judicial resources is incapable of the sort of practically infinite expansion needed to keep pace with unchecked, lawyer-driven, civil case

demands. Moreover, expanding the federal judiciary beyond a certain point
which point appears to be very near, if it has not already been reached causes at least as many problems as it solves.
There is a point of diminishing returns reached by increasing the size of
the federal judiciary - in terms of administration and adjudicative ambigu-

that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.");
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1973) (refusing to recognize
wealth as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes). But see Frank Michelman,
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights - Part II,
1974 DUKE L.J. 527, 534-540 (positing that under equal protection, the right of access to the
courts is essentially analogous to the fundamental right to vote); Morris B. Abram, Access to
the Judicial Process, 6 GA. L. REV. 247, 259 (1972) ("Just as the equal protection clause
prohibits conditioning the right to vote on wealth, it should also prohibit the use of wealth to
control access to the courts. Both voting and access to the courts are forms of enfranchisement, of participation in the political process."); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 285-291 (4th ed. 1841) (trial by jury in the United States considered as a political
institution).
74. See Eu, 979 F.2d at 708 ("In 1986, California passed the Trial Court Delay Reduction
Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 68600-68620 (West Supp. 1992), which concentrates on delay reduction through case management techniques. The statistics in the record suggest that the Delay
Reduction Act has helped reduce, though it surely has not eliminated, California's civil backlog. We cannot say that the California legislature's decision to address court delays primarily
through case management techniques rather than multiplication of judicial positions is irrational."); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973) (when no
fundamental right or suspect class is involved, a court need only determine whether the program rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated governmental purpose).
75. STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
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ity. As the Federal Courts Study Committee noted, even if a highly competent federal judiciary consisting of thousands of judges could be created and
maintained, the coordination of so many judges would be extraordinarily
difficult. 76 Additional district court judges would necessitate the creation of
more appeals judges (because of the higher rate of appeals flowing from
more district court judges). And the more appeals judges there are, the
more difficult it is for the Supreme Court to maintain uniformity of federal
decisional law (because of the Court's limited capacity to review decisions of
the lower courts). The maintenance of the necessary minimum uniformity of
law within a single circuit becomes difficult if there are a great many judges
in a circuit. Problems of size and intracircuit decisional ambiguity led to the
division of the Fifth Circuit, and they now threaten to have the same effect
upon the Ninth. While this problem can be alleviated by increasing the
number of circuits, the result inevitably is to increase the number of intercircuit conflicts, and hence, ultimately to increase the burden on the Supreme
Court.77 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist emphasized these concerns in
his 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary:
As one of my colleagues on the court of appeals has noted, a federal
judiciary rising above 1,000 members will be of lesser quality and could
be dominated by a bureaucracy of ancillary personnel. It could also end
up being divided into an almost unmanageable number of circuits or
plagued by appellate courts of unmanageable size, with an increasingly
incoherent body of federal law and a Supreme Court incapable of mainlaw. The time has come to reexamine the
taining uniformity in federal
78
role of the federal courts.
There are other problems inhering in the continued expansion of the federal judiciary. An ever-expanding federal judiciary becomes less and less
consistent with the fundamental Constitutional concept of limited federal
government, and then grows more and more inconsistent with that concept.
Also, many of the situations most deserving of federal intervention involve
protection of individual liberties against the actions of the political branches
of government. "Such intervention is more likely to win public acceptance if
the federal judiciary is perceived as a small and special corps of men and
women whose talents are reserved for issues that transcend local concern,
rather than as a faceless, omnipresent bureaucracy," or just another court of
79
general jurisdiction that happens to be funded by the federal government.
In short, it appears clear that the size of the federal judiciary is very near
its feasible limit, if it has not already reached it (at least, in terms of the
maintenance of basic characteristics litigants look for in the federal courts).
Yet real solutions to the civil litigation problems of cost and delay are nowhere in sight.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 8.
78. William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary, THE THIRD
BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1992, at 2.
79. STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
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THE DEMAND-SIDE PROBLEM-SOLVING PRETENDER: THE
REGRESSIVE TAXATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES

There is another, demand-side - or privatization - pretender to the title
of systemic problem-solver. The demand-side school of thought teaches that
a solution to the problem of overcrowded dockets, at least, is to increase
court access fees so as to ration access - to charge most users of the system
a more significant portion of the amount now largely subsidized by taxpayers. 80 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner has written that stiff access
fees would tend to divert cases with relatively small monetary stakes from
the federal court system toward "more suitable dispute-resolution
processes."'' s Essentially, a fixed user fee would constitute a higher percentage tax on such cases than on cases with "big stakes." "There would thus be
a shift in the composition of the nonindigent civil docket toward litigants
who have a big stake in the outcome of their lawsuit - and they are the best
kind of litigants to have in a court system [because financially significant
'82
cases make good law]."
However, we doubt that the "bigness" or "littleness" of the "stakes" involved in federal civil litigation necessarily equates for all purposes with the
amount of money in controversy. And we find the proposed regressive taxation of the federal court resource to be unfair. This unfairness is not, in our
view, adequately alleviated by Judge Posner's recognition that cases with
significant positive externalities (i.e., possessing substantial precedential
value for taxpayers/potential litigants) - should be encouraged through
public subsidization.8 3 In anticipation of such criticism, Judge Posner argues that "the principle of using money to ration access to particular courts
is implicit in the diversity jurisdiction's minimum amount in controversy
requirement, and until a few years ago there was a minimum amount requirement in many classes of federal question cases."' 84 But the limited
existence of this principle within the federal court system does not necessarily mean that the principle should be extended across the federal case
landscape.
Judge Posner admits that if fewer cases involving issues of federal law are
litigated in federal courts, and more in state courts, there will likely be fewer
conflicts between federal circuits but more conflicts between states. 85 "[A]nd
80. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 131-

34 (1985). Judge Posner argues that, under the crisis circumstances in the federal courts, the
current public subsidy of civil litigation "is far too great," and that "we ought to stop encouraging federal litigation; and realistic user fees are a natural and attractive method of doing so
with regard to civil litigation between nonindigents." Id. at 132.
81. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. [W]e subsidize litigation by making the taxpayers rather than the litigants bear
some litigation costs, namely the costs of the judicial system itself, on the theory
that the taxpayers as potential litigants benefit from the forensic exertions of the
actual litigants.
There is nothing wrong with this theory; the interesting question is what the optimum subsidy is today. Id. at 131-32.
84. Id. at 133.
85. Id. at 133-35.
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since there are almost four times as many states as there are circuits, the
potential for conflicts that only the Supreme Court can resolve will be
greater."'8 6 We perceive this to be a significantly inefficient function of Judge
Posner's proposal. And our concern in this respect is not lessened by Judge
Posner's statement that the exact amount of increased interstate conflicts
heading for the Supreme Court under his proposal "is uncertain; and the
problem would not exist with respect to those reallocated cases that were
diversity cases." 87
Moreover, litigants taxed out of the federal courts under the demand-side
model would presumably try to go to state courts or private, "alternative"
dispute resolution forums. Yet, even assuming the existence of enough state
courts and private ADR forums to meet the demand flowing away from the
fee-barricaded federal courts, someone still must pay for this litigation.
What if the state courts raise their fees stiffly as well? How much will private arbitration cost then? 88 Who will monitor the quality of the justice dispensed by private ADR decisionmakers? Even if small claims courts and the
like are available for litigants looking for a courtroom, as Judge Posner
posits,89 will they be adequate? 90
We think the demand-side, or privatization model fails to pay sufficient
attention to the fact that federal court causes of action are largely products
of the country's democratic processes. And the federal courts play a vital
role in our Constitutional conception of government. Thus, we think it is
clear that federal judicial resources are more properly understood as public,
rather than private goods. 91 Given the public import of federal cases and
courts, "[w]e should be very suspicious of proposed solutions that permit
people with dollars to get to the head of the line and not share the burdens of
overloaded systems" of civil dispute resolution. 92 Indeed, Congress has
sought to ensure general, meaningful access to federal court services. At
86. Id. at 135.

87. Id.
88. See id. at 134 ("some of the federal cases would be shunted to private arbitration,
especially if the states followed the lead of the federal government and raised their court filing
fees.").
89. Id. ("Admittedly, if [state courts followed the lead of the federal government and
raised their court filing fees] there would be a danger of overdiscouraging litigation, especially
by persons just above the indigence level. But this is not an imminent danger; and even if some
state courts begin to charge stiff filing fees, others - small claims courts, for example - will
not.").
90. Judge Posner admits that "there may be a reduction in the quality of adjudication if
cases involving federal claims are shunted to state courts." Id. at 135.
91. See supra Section III. A. 1.; Brier, Comment, Economics Awry, supra note 70, at 11971207, and authorities cited and discussed therein (criticizing Judge Posner's proposition on this
ground).
92. Tigar, 2020 Vision, supra note 1,at 92; see also Baruch Bush, Process Choice, supra
note 40, at 919 ("If a disputant feels he is entitled to some assistance in handling his dispute,
and none is forthcoming, . . . he may well feel betrayed by society and question the legitimacy
of its institutions."); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1920-21 (1989)
(addressing the notion that the legitimacy of the federal judiciary in the view of the people
depends upon the people feeling capable of actually vindicating their individual rights through
the federal legal system).
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least, that is the promise of the Federal Rules and the aim of the Civil Justice
93
Reform Act.
C.

TOWARD REFORMATION:

THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

OF 1990
The federal courts' institutional response to a general, ever-increasing
awareness of the need for fundamental change in our system of civil dispute
resolution has been predictably timid. 94 The Federal Courts Study Committee's Report recommended but "incremental" changes to the traditional civil
dispute resolution system - amounting to the mere cross-breeding of systemic organisms actually in need of gene-splicing. 95 The bar's vested economic interest in the status quo - with virtually unlimited access to billable
hours for overdiscovery and overpreparation of cases generally destined to
be settled anyway - has effectively silenced the group that should have been
the most vocal protector of the interests of litigants. The only real attempt
to secure the change necessary to ensure meaningful access to civil dispute
resolution for all of the people has come not from the courts or the bar, but
from Congress.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) represents a necessary first
step toward making our system of civil dispute resolution responsive to the
needs of the people who use and support it: the taxpayers. 9 6 Credit should
go where credit is due. Senator Joe Biden, with single-minded determination, secured passage of this controversial legislation. Senator Biden, adopt93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[These rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.
§ 471 (Supp. 1992) (aiming "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits,
monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes.").
94. For example, while the United States Supreme Court has used its authority to make
periodic amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such measures have not been
aggressive enough to significantly curtail the surging civil litigation costs and delay of recent
years. See, e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523
(1980) (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J. and Rehnquist, J. dissenting from the Court's adoption
of the 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - in order to decry their
inadequacy in the face of the courts' acute problems of rising costs and delay:
"I do not dissent because the modest amendments recommended by the Judicial
Conference are undesirable. I simply believe that Congress' acceptance of these
tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms.... Meanwhile, the discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to those
least able to bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court
costs).
See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (experience under
the federal discovery Rules demonstrates that "not infrequently [they have been] exploited to
the disadvantage of justice."). And respecting the courts' institutional risk-aversion, see Newman, Rethinking Fairness,supra note 10, at 1646 ("Why is it that the earnest efforts of so many
well-intentioned reformers yield such minor alterations? There are several answers plainly in
view. One is the institutional resistance to fundamental change. Most institutions are inhospitable to change, and the institutions of the law are especially so.").
95. See STUDY COMMIT"EE, REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-28.
96. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. III 1991) (enacted as
Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 103(a), 104 Stat.

5090-96 (1990)).
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ing the attitude of Farragut at Mobile Bay, proceeded full speed ahead in
spite of the concern of the judiciary that the bill potentially encroached upon
traditional notions of separation of powers. 97 The vision afforded by hindsight reveals the wisdom of Senator Biden's actions. "Judicial independence" to fashion rules and procedures for a system of civil justice that is
"affordable" only for the very rich and the very poor is a hollow concept
indeed - one certainly failing to contribute to citizen confidence in the
government.
While the Civil Justice Reform Act is unremarkable in the sense that it
primarily utilizes recognized case management techniques to control litigation cost and delay, it is quite remarkable in that it takes a substantial step
toward transforming civil dispute resolution from a lawyer-driven system to
a court-driven one. This change in direction is essential if meaningful access
to the courts is to be afforded the average citizen - who too often finds
himself in an economic conflict with the person (his lawyer) historically
counted on to make decisions regarding the appropriate extent of discovery
(the 1980 and 1983 changes to the Rules notwithstanding) and therefore, the
extent of billable hours.
The Act incorporates two additional concepts that are noteworthy. First,
it attempts to expand the focus of judges, from the narrow perspective of
providing a fair and unbiased forum - through a traditional trial - to the
recognition that judges also have an equally important role in litigation cost
containment. Second, the Act is open-ended; provisions are made for evaluation of the success of the measures adopted and implemented by the district
courts. The RAND Corporation (RAND) has been selected as the independent organization to both compile and evaluate data from ten pilot and
ten comparison courts. Its report is due in 1995 and will include an analysis
of over 30,000 cases. In the meantime, the CJRA provides a remarkable
degree of freedom for experimentation by the district courts, the results of
which will be fertile ground for evaluation by the Federal Judicial Center,
the Judicial Conference, consumer groups, and innumerable academics.
The procedures imposed under the Act require a high level of civil-justiceuser input through advisory groups composed of both litigants and lawyers.98 It forces examination of cost and delay and an evaluation of court
dockets. The ten pilot districts were obligated under the Act to include, and
the eighty-four remaining districts were obligated to consider including in
their cost and delay reduction plans: systematic, differential treatment of
civil cases; early and on-going control through involvement of judicial officers, including the control of the extent of discovery, the encouragement of
cost-effective disclosure of information, and mechanisms that force commu97. Admiral David G. Farragut, at the Battle of Mobile Bay, Aug. 5, 1864 ("Damn the

torpedoes! Full Speed Ahead."), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 28
(4th ed. 1992).
98. See generally Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United': The Civil JusticeReform Act of 1990, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105-06 (1991).
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nication between counsel; and authorization to refer cases to alternate dispute resolution.
While the Act takes a necessary first step in the right direction, it does not
go far enough to achieve true reform of our currently inadequate system of
civil dispute resolution. Cases filed subject to Civil Justice Reform Act plans
adopted by the various courts are still bound by traditional case management techniques and the traditional trial model. It is highly questionable
that merely facilitating deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits in
the traditional manner - even with monitoring, the limiting of discovery,
and improved litigation management - will actually "ensure just, speedy,
and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes," 99 which is the aim of the Act.
More is needed.
VI. CONCLUSION: AN HOLISTIC VISION OF THE
REFORMATION MODEL OF CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
When the period of experimentation under the Civil Justice Reform Act
has ended, when RAND has compiled its data and made its report in 1995,
and when the academics and the bureaucrats have written their articles
"pro" and "con," the focus of attention will once again shift to Congress.
Given the important societal interests at stake, Congress is the body that
must act to reform our system of civil dispute resolution. 1°° If Congress
99. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. III 1991).

100. See Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra note 23, at 444 ("[i]f the time to reappraise the
process of adjudication has arrived, the work should not be left to the judiciary, its support
staff, a handful of academics, or a few American Bar Association committees. Rather, the
hard questions about pace ...,allocation of authority . . ., and the continued existence of the
adversary process ...should be subjected to a more searching and free-ranging public debate."); Scott, Trial by Jury, supra note 47, at 671 ("Only those incidents [of trial by jury]
which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by
jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature. The question of the constitutionality of
any particular modification of the law as to trial by jury ... is a question of substance, not of
form."); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (because "[m]aintenance of the jury as a
fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence... any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care."). But see Linda A. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformationin ProceduralJustice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 384 (1992) (the first, "factual groundwork" article in a two-part series
printed in the Minnesota Law Review, which two-part series posits and seeks to demonstrate
that the CJRA represents a congressional attempt to "strip the judicial branch of its procedural rulemaking authority under the guise of 'substantive effects,' "in "violat[ion of] the separation of powers doctrine, which commits control over internal court housekeeping affairs,
including the promulgation of procedural rules, to the judiciary."). Only after we wrote (and
titled) our article did we become aware of Professor Mullenix's Minnesota Law Review series.
We find ourselves in apparent disagreement with Professor Mullenix relative to whether the
CJRA and the procedural justice developments it ushers in are appropriate and positive as a
matter of democratic rulemaking. We think it entirely appropriate, for example, that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules be forced to undergo a reformation in thinking along the lines
of the Roman Catholic Church's 16th century experience - in response to the congressionallyposted reformation of the country's civil dispute resolution procedural regime. By so reforming itself, we are of the opinion that the Committee can prevent the doom prophesied by
Professor Mullenix: i.e., that the Committee will be transformed "into a quaint, third-branch
vestigial organ." Id. at 379. In short, we regard the model of civil dispute resolution envisioned by this article as: (1) the natural, appropriate and necessary fruit of valid CJRA-instigated experimentation; and (2) the culmination of the long preparatory movement toward true
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merely institutionalizes and brings uniformity to the incremental, tinkering
case management changes permitted under the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, Congress will deliver to society "half a loaf" instead of the true reform
needed to ensure that fair, efficient, taxpayer-supported civil dispute resolution has a significant place in our country's future. We must break the economic stranglehold the traditional model has on civil litigation and provide
an array of court-annexed methods to resolve civil disputes - an array of
public, cost and time effective methods carrying at least a presumption of
finality.
The model posited in this article reflects our attempt to demonstrate at
least one way civil dispute resolution would be conducted under the "comprehensive justice center" concept that is increasingly the focus of attention
of those of us groping for a solution to the "civil justice problem." However,
the debate is not limited to case management techniques or how litigation
may be structured in the federal district courts. The line committees and the
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference are examining
proposed structural changes in the judiciary that could contribute to improved administration of justice. Among the proposals under consideration
are these: inhibiting the growth or even capping the size of the federal judiciary; redefining or reorganizing districts to be state-wide or circuit-wide, in
order to increase efficiency and better enable the courts to provide judge
power where needed; creating a national court of appeals or reducing the
number of circuits and greatly reducing the number of appellate judges in
each circuit - in order to temper conflicts among the circuits and to facilitate a more cohesive body of circuit law; and implementing mechanisms permitting discretionary review at the court of appeals level.
Hopefully, civil justice reform will proceed in terms of both case management techniques and structural changes. We certainly think Congress must
address whether the current price extracted from society by the traditional
civil litigation system - not only in economic terms, but also in terms of the
public's loss of confidence in the ability of government to respond fairly to
the needs of the people - compels Congress to at least reform the civil litigation model.

reformation of civil procedural justice, which preparation began with the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.

